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This paper reviews my personal inclinations and fascination with the area of unconventional computing.
Computing can be perceived as an inscription in a “Rosetta Stone,” one category akin to physics, and therefore
as a form of comprehension of nature: at least from a purely syntactic perspective, to comprehend means to be
able to algorithmically produce it. I also address the question of why there is computation, and sketch a research
program based on primordial chaos, out of which order and even self-referential perception emerges by way of
evolution.
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Computation and physics as categories
Nowadays I might be able to express my long time intu-
ition in a category theoretical form [1]: in short, computation
and physics are both categories linked by functors. Thereby
category theory serves as a sort of Rosetta Stone [2], mak-
ing possible a translation among very similar, possibly equiv-
alent, structures – with the functors serving as translators back
and forth between the physical and the computational uni-
verses. One may even enlarge this picture by other categories
like mathematics, and the natural transformations between the
possible functors. In what follows I shall rant about computa-
tion as a metaphysical as well as metamathematical metaphor.
At the same time, computation could also be understood as a
narrative designed to navigate and manipulate the impression
of what we experience as physical world.
First it should be acknowledged that, on the one hand,
although conceptualized with paper-and-pencil operations in
mind [3, p. 34], the category of computation, as many struc-
tures invented by our minds, including mathematics and the-
ology [4] or our money [5], appears to be “suspended in free
thought” – and solely grounded in our belief in it.
On the other hand, there appears to be “physical stuff out
there” which at first peek appears to be rather solid and “ma-
terial.” Alas, the deeper we have looked into it, and the bet-
ter our means to spatially resolve matter became, the more
this stuff looked like an emptiness containing point parti-
cles of zero extension. Moreover, throughout the history
of natural sciences, there appears to be no convergence of
“causes,” but rather a succession of alternating narrations and
(re)presentations as to why this stuff interacts: take what we
today call gravity, turning from mythology to Ptolemaian ge-
ometry to Newtonian force back to Einsteinian space-time ge-
ometry [6]. And this is a far cry from explaining why some-
thing exists at all – even if this something might turn out to
be primordial chaos, or an initial singularity (possibly hiding
other cycles of other universes).
Indeed, it can be expected that, for an embedded observer in
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a virtual reality, the computational intrinsic “phenomenology”
supporting such an agent appears just as “material,” and even
“quantum complementary like” [7], as our own universe is ex-
perienced by us. A surreal feeling is expressed by Prospero in
Shakespeare’s Tempest, claiming that “we are such stuff as
dreams are made on.” (Some [8] have therefore concluded
that science cannot offer much anchor from which to compre-
hend and cope with the absurdities of our existence.) Ought
we therefore not be allowed to assume that the category sub-
sumed under the name “physics” contains entities and struc-
tures which are not dissimilar to computation?
Second, consider the functors which – like a function –
assigns to each entity in the physical world an entity in the
computational universe. More specifically, the Church-Turing
thesis, interpreted as functor between physics and computa-
tion, specifies that every capacity in the physical world is re-
flected by some computational, algorithmic capacity of what
is known today as a partial recursive function, or universal
Turing computability. This is a highly nontrivial claim which
needs to be corroborated or falsified with every physical ca-
pacity we discover. It is, so to say, under “permanent attack”
from physics. Although highly likely, nobody can guarantee
that it will survive the next day. To give one exotic and highly
speculative example: maybe someone eventually comes up
with a clever way of building infinity machines with some
Zeno squeezed cycles. It is also interesting to note that one
might be able to resolve the seemingly contradicting claims
of “information is physical” by Landauer, as well as “it from
bit” by Wheeler, through perceiving both physics and compu-
tation as categories linked by functors.
A universal computer, hooked up to a quantum random
number generator (serving as an oracle for randomness) is
supposed to be (relative to the validity of orthodox quantum
mechanics) a machine transcending universal computational
capacities. Claims of computational capacities beyond Tur-
ing’s universal computability may turn out to be difficult to
(dis)prove. One way might involve zero-knowledge proofs or
zero-knowledge protocols; but I am unaware of any such cri-
terion [9]. Unfortunately, some such instances, in particular
“true randomness” or “true (in)determinism” as claimed by
quantum information theory, due to reductions to the halting
and rule inference problems, are provable impossible to prove.
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2The converse functor, mapping entities from universal com-
putation into entities in the physical universe is considered un-
problematic. After all, in principle, given enough stuff, uni-
versal computers could be physically realized; at least up to
some finite means. These finite physical means induce bounds
on universal computability [10].
In any case, this category theoretical view could immedi-
ately resolve “the unreasonable effectiveness of mathemat-
ics in the natural sciences” [11] by essentially identifying
the two categories; more precisely, by tying them together
with the Church-Turing thesis, or generalizations thereof,
should the latter become necessary. As Yanofsky has pointed
out throughout our conversations, any such identification is
not immediately wrong only “if one adopts the construc-
tivist/Bishop philosophy of mathematics. . . . But, if you do not
follow that school, and you are either a Platonist or a nom-
inalist, then mathematics is more than computation. In that
case “physics=computation” still does not answer Wigner’s
mystery.” For these latter cases one might argue that evo-
lution has given us the gift to imagine ways and forms of
mathematics (such as the continuum) which go beyond the
constructivist/Bishop philosophy of mathematics. And even
then, in order to be substantiated this “physis=computation”
metaphor would have involve an infinite universe (to operate
a universal Turing machine), as well as some (metaphysical)
“corroboration” (such as an ineffable [12] believe therein) that
the Church-Turing thesis is correct.
Thus, speaking about computation might be like speaking
about physics. And any capacity of one category has to show
up in the other one as well. In view of this it is highly ques-
tionable if nonconstructive entities such as continua are more
than a formal convenience, if not a distractive misrepresenta-
tion, of physical capacities.
Optimized dissipation of energy through computation
Let me, in the second part, come to a sketch of the semantic
aspect of the categories compared earlier; and just how and
why they could have formed.
Suppose that there exist (we do not attempt here to explain
why this should be so; for instance due to fluctuations or ini-
tial values) two regions in space with a difference in temper-
ature, or, more generally, energy (density). Suppose further
that there is some interface, such as empty space, or material
structure, or agent, allowing physical dissipative flows from
one region into the other, connecting these two regions. Then,
as expressed by the second law of thermodynamics [13], there
will be an exchange of energy, whereby statistically energy
flows from hot to cold through the interface. So far, this is a
purely physical process.
Let us concentrate on the interface. More specifically, let
us consider a variety of interfaces, and look at their rela-
tive efficiency or “fitness” (we are slowly entering an evolu-
tion type domain here). Undoubtedly, all things equal, the
type of interface with the highest throughput rate of energy
per time will dominate the dissipation process: it can “grab
the biggest piece of the cake.” Finding good or even op-
timal interfaces might be facilitated through random muta-
tion; thereby roaming through an abstract space of possible
interface states and configurations. The situation will become
even more dynamic if the relative magnitude of the various
processes can change over time. In particular, if a very effi-
cient process (which needs not be the most efficient) can self-
replicate. Then a regime emerges which is dominated by the
Matthew effect [14] of compound interest: the population of
the strongest interface will increase relative to less effective
interfaces by the rate of compound interest – which is effec-
tively exponential. This means that the growth rates will at
first look linear (and thus sustainable), but later grow faster
and faster until either all the energy is distributed or other side
conditions limit this growth. Now, if we identify certain inter-
faces with biological entities we end up with a sort of biolog-
ical evolution driven by physical processes; in particular, by
energy dissipation [15].
How does computation come into this picture? Actually,
quite straightforwardly, if we are willing to continue this spec-
ulative path: systems which compute can serve as, and even
construct and produce, better interfaces for energy dissipa-
tion than systems without algorithmics. Thus, through mu-
tation, that is trial-and-error driven by random walks through
roaming configurations and state space, the universe, and in
particular, self-reproducing agents and units, have learned to
compute. This is, essentially, a scenario for the emergence of
mathematics and of universal computation.
One could go one step further and speculate that the percep-
tion and representation of the self; that is, self-awareness and
consciousness, emerged in the same way: driven to dissipate –
that is, in moralistic terms, use and waste – as much energy as
possible. As depicted somewhat ironically in Fig. 1, compu-
tation, mathematics, the human mind, emerge as – and have
evolved because of, and are still driven by – mere facilities
and vehicles for optimal heat exchange. Stated differently, the
universe attempts to “perceive” and “understand” itself better;
the goal being optimized “self-digestion;” that is, dissipation
of energy.
This might be perceived as rather sobering, even dystopian
perspective, from which the evolution of species, conscious-
ness, mathematics and computation appear as means to “waste
more energy” than without these emergent utilities. Questions
of ethics and ultimately divinity are pertinent. Yet all we can
say is that even in a universe of primordial chaos – note that,
just like Egon von Schweidler in 1905 speculated that the laws
of radioactive decay are merely probabilistic [16], so might all
of our natural laws be merely probabilistic, and therefore sub-
ject to deviations from their standard form for “small” scales –
the gods, and thus law and order, might have evolved as prin-
ciples of social conditioning, in particular when, very late in
this chain of events, societies formed and secular and religious
powers underwent a symbiosis. This provides a context to
Nietzsche’s critique of slave morality (transgressed by Marx-
ism) [17]. Alas, his obvious failure to suggest alternatives be-
yond Greek thinking (see also the Milian dialogue [18, Chap-
ter V, § 84-116]) might have been due to the nonexistence of
formal techniques at the time. Nowadays game theory [19, 20]
seems to be well equipped for a relativized view of good and
3FIG. 1. Evolution of species and computation, driven by the second law of thermodynamics (as inspired by England’s et al approach [15]):
(i) interface between hot and cold regions is empty space; (ii) plant interface capable of more dissipation than empty space; (iii) animals and,
in particular, humans (drawn political correctly) present interfaces with improved (over plants and emptyness) energy dissipation; (iv) humans
with engines and universal computation capacities (indicated by “T” for “universal Turing machine”) can consume even more energy than
standalone.
evil. A relativized view of morality seems to have also been
endorsed by Paul Dirac in a forgotten lecture [21]. This lec-
ture on the futility of (nuclear) war, which I had the privilege
to attend, deeply impressed my thinking on these matters ever
since.
The physical “underpinning” or “layer” argued earlier is in
the spirit of Landauer’s “information is physical,” thereby ex-
tending it to “consciousness is physical.” It requires no god
of miracles or god of the gaps; yet it cannot explain the initial
boot-up of the universe.
Let me end this very brief perspective with the acknowl-
edgement that one constant source of inspiration and moti-
vation has been the cooperation with Cristian Calude and his
tolerant and open-minded approach, as well as his genuine in-
terest in the physical layers of information and computation.
This brief account partly presents my recollection of, and re-
flections on, recent discussions with Noson Yanofsky at his
Brooklyn home. I am also deeply thankful for many pertinent
discussions with Gregory Chaitin, Alexander Leitsch, the late
Ernst Specker, among many other patient and passionate fel-
low researchers sharing a common goal: the pursuit of what
every individual one of us, in (in)effable ways [12] calls truth.
This work was supported in part by the John Templeton Foun-
dation’s Randomness and Providence: an Abrahamic Inquiry
Project.
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